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LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOT.BS

plaintiffs indeed had the right of privacy, but
also realized that modem law enforcement is
greatly aided by extensive identification records
and that the public has the right to protect
itself. Judicial notice was taken of the fact that
the identification records of the Chicago Police
Department are not available to the general
public. Thus, the conjectural harm that is
caused by the retention of the records by the
police is outweighted by the potential benefit
the records may bring to the public. The court
said that in this case, "the rights of the individual must be subordinated to the safety of the
public", and only a specific mandate from the
state legislature would compel the return of the
records of identification.
Refusal to Take Intoxication Test Not Admissible as Evidence in Chief-The defendant
was charged with the offense of driving while
intoxicated. At the trial, the complaining witness testified that in his opinion the defendant
was drunk because he was red-faced and had
refused to take a test, the test not being identified. A police officer testified that the defendant
was unsteady on his feet, spoke brokenly,
thick of tongue, red-faced and smelled of
whiskey. Then, over the objection of the defendant, the trial court allowed the prosecution
in its case in chief to ask the officer if the defendant had refused to take an intoximeter
test. The question and its answer, that the
defendant had refused, was repeated several
times over continued objection. In addition,
the officer was allowed to testify over the defendant's objection, as to what the results
would have shown if the defendant had submitted. A majority of the Criminal Court of
Appeals of Oklahoma first acknowledged that
the defendant had the right to refuse to take
the intoximeter test and then held that the
State could not bring forth comment as to the
defendant's refusal to take the test in its case
in chief. Duckworth v. State, 309 P. 2d 1103
(Okl. 1957).
The majority pointed out that previous cases
state that the defendant had a right under the
law to refuse to take the intoximeter test, and
that the defendant's exercise of this right was

used by the State for purely prejudicial purposes. The majority said that it could conceive
of no greater inconsistency than to allow a
right, protected by law, indirectly destroyed by
innuendo. The rule against self-incrimination
was not applicable to the present case, according to the majority, because no evidence of
probative value was in issue. "The refusal to
take the intoximeter test constitutes what might
be termed a negative predicate which was
productive of nothing more than sheer speculation, surmise, and innuendo." In addition, the
majority stated that allowing the state to raise
the presumption that the defendant was intoxicated from his justified refusal to take an
intoximeter test would violate a state statute.
This statute provided that the failure of a
defendant to testify shall raise no presumption
against him, and if commented upon by counsel,
it is grounds for a new trial.
In a concurring opinion, one judge said that
the statute relied upon by the majority was
inapplicable because oral evidence was not in
question. The statute, according to the opinion,
merely reiterates the self-incriminatory provision of the state constitution, and thus concerns
only oral evidence. In addition, the opinion
stated that the writer did "not agree that the
State in making out its case could not show
whether or not an officer offered to give the
accused an intoximeter test, and whether the
test was given, and if not, why not". However,
the judge thought a new trial should be given
the defendant because the question as to
whether or not the defendant refused to take
the intoxication test was repeated many times,
and because the defendant was not arrested
when first observed by the police, but permitted
to report to the police on his own. From the
cases cited in the concurring opinion, it would
seem that if the State had forced the defendant
to submit to an intoxication test, the results of
the test would have been admissible unless the
methods used "were shocking to the judicial
conscience and held violative of the due process
clause of the Federal Constitution".
The petition for rehearing was denied and
the judge who had previously concurred with
the majority dissented. The sole question raised
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by the petition was whether or not the defendant had a right to refuse to take the intoxication test. The dissent pointed out the
distinction between applying the rule against
self-incrimination to oral evidence and physical
or real evidence, indicating that it is inapplicable to the latter. In pointing out that
blood can be taken from an unconscious person
without consent, Breithaupt v. Abram, 352
U.S. 432 (1957), the dissent stated that the
majority view is contrary to the law of the land.
Evidence Illegally Seized by City Police
Admissible in Federal Prosecution Where
Federal Officer's Presence at Raid was Inadvertent-City police, armed with a search
warrant which later proved to be invalid, raided
a rooming house where the defendant lived and
found a quantity of illegal whiskey. While the
raid was in progress, a federal officer came to
the rooming house in connection with a different case and was informed as to what was
happening. The federal officer had no advance
knowledge of the raid and took no part in it.
However, after observing a quantity of illegal
whiskey exposed by the city police, he called
other federal authorities and the city police
agreed to allow the federal government to
prosecute the defendant under Internal
Revenue Code provisions. The evidence ob
tained by the city police was introduced overhe objection of the defendant, who was found
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guilty of concealing and having whiskey in his
possession with intent to evade the payment of
the federal tax. The court held that the inadvertent presence of a federal officer at the scene
of a raid by city police was not sufficient to
make the raid a federal undertaking and that
evidence illegally obtained by the city police
was thus admissible in a federal court. United
States v.Brown, 151 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Va.
1957).
The court recognized the well established rule
of the inadmissibility, in a federal prosecution,
of evidence illegally seized by federal officers.
Thus, the court was faced with the question of
whether or not the presence of the federal
officer at the raid by the city police, in effect,
made the raid a federal undertaking so as to
invoke the exclusionary rule. The court, after
reviewing the subject of search and seizure
under the fourth amendment, stated that the
evidence was admissible because a "bilateral
clear common understanding or agreement"
was not found to exist between the city police
and federal officers. However, after adjudging
the defendant guilty, the court said that the
defendant was entitled to bail pending appeal
"by reason of the ambiguity existing in the
decisions of all courts touching upon the questions involving searches and seizures under the
fourth amendment".
(For other recent case abstracts see pp. 430432, supra.)

